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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 By leave granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 1993), Hoffmann-
Roche, Inc. ("Hoffmann-La Roche") appeals an interlocutory order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The district court's order granted a 
motion of former Hoffmann-La Roche employees to toll the statute of limitations in an age 
discrimination class action. Sperling claims Hoffmann-La Roche engaged in age 
discrimination against all similarly situated Hoffmann-La Roche employees in violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & 
Supp. 1993).  Tolling gave unnamed employees an opportunity to become members of the opt
in class that named appellees, Richard Sperling, Frederick Hemsley and Joseph Zelauskas 
(collectively "Sperling"), represent. 
 Class actions for age discrimination are authorized by section 7(b) of ADEA 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b)).  Section 7(b) of ADEA expressly borrows the 
opt-in class mechanism of section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West Supp. 1993)).  Section 16(b) of FLSA is 
itself modified by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. 
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§§ 251-262 (West 1985)).  Section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 255, was 
expressly incorporated into ADEA until 1991.  See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e)(1) (repealed as of 
Nov. 21, 1991).0 
 Section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 256, states an opt-in class 
member's claim for relief under FLSA does not commence until the date the opt-in member's 
written consent to join the representative action is filed.  Section 7, unlike section 6 
of the Portal-to-Portal Act, was not expressly incorporated into ADEA. 
 Over 400 persons filed consents to join Sperling's opt-in class within the 
limitations period, but 102 did not file consents until after expiration of unamended 
section 626(e)(1)'s two year statute of limitations on individual actions for non-willful 
violations of ADEA.  Sperling contends these 102 consents were timely filed because the 
named plaintiffs' filing of a complaint in a representative action under ADEA legally 
tolls the statute of limitations.  The district court agreed and granted Sperling's motion 
to legally toll the statute for the 102 persons whose individual actions would have been 
barred.  See Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 357, 366 (D.N.J. 1992).
 Hoffmann-La Roche moved for interlocutory review of the legal tolling issue 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b).  The district court certified the following question to 
us pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b): 
[T]he issue of whether filing of the original complaint in this action 
tolled the statute of limitations for those plaintiffs who joined the 
action pursuant to this Court's Order dated January 5, 1988, involves 
                     
0At the time Sperling filed suit, former section 626(e)(1) of ADEA incorporated the two 
year statute of limitations for non-willful violations set forth in section 6 of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act.   See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e)(1) (West 1985).  The Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I, § 115, 105 Stat. 1079, amended section 626(e)(1) of 
ADEA.  Under the current version of section 626(e), effective November 21, 1991, section 6 
of the Portal-to-Portal Act is no longer expressly incorporated and the statute of 
limitations for an age discrimination action is 90 days after receipt of a notice that "a 
charge filed with the [EEOC] under this chapter is dismissed or the proceedings of the 
[EEOC] are otherwise terminated by the [EEOC]."  29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e) (effective Nov.
1991) (West Supp. 1993).  Neither party argues that the new limitations period applies 
retroactively.  Thus, the unamended version of section 626(e)(1) is the applicable statute 
of limitations.  See also infra n.14. 
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a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation. 
 
 
Joint Appendix ("App.) at 14A-15A.  Hoffmann-La Roche thereafter filed a petition seeking 
our permission to appeal, as section 1292(b) requires.  We granted its petition. 
 Whether an opt-in member in a class action can join a representative suit filed 
under ADEA after the statute of limitations on individual actions has run is a matter of 
first impression in our Court.  We answer in the affirmative.  Under ADEA we believe 
Congress did not intend to restrict opt-in classes to employees who file consents within 
the applicable statute of limitations that section 16(b) of FLSA and section 6 of the 
Portal-to-Portal act set for individual age discrimination claims.  To the contrary, we 
believe that Congress expressed its intent to permit additional members to opt-in and join 
the class by filing consents after the statute of limitations on their individual actions 
would have run when it omitted section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act from those portions 
of FLSA that it incorporated into ADEA's original statute of limitations.  We therefor
hold qualified plaintiffs may join a representative action for age discrimination after 
the time period for their individual actions has lapsed when the representative plaintiffs 
have filed a complaint within the statute of limitations set forth in section 6 of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act, provided, however, that the representatives have framed their 
complaint in a manner that puts the employer on notice that it will be called upon to 
defend an opt-in class action.0  Therefore, we will affirm the district court's order 
granting Sperling's motion to legally toll the statute of limitations and remand the case 
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with that order and our answer to 
the certified question this appeal presents. 
                     
0As a prerequisite to their court action, we have previously held that the class 
representatives must include a similar notice in the charge they file with the EEOC
Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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I. 
 On February 4, 1985, Hoffmann-La Roche discharged or demoted about 1,200 
employees in a systematic reduction of its work force.  Sperling was one of them.  He 
filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") on behalf of all similarly situated employees.  On May 7, 1985, Sperling filed 
his representative action in the district court.  The complaint alleged that Hoffmann
Roche had engaged in unlawful age discrimination, clearly indicated its representative 
nature, and was filed within the then applicable two year statute of limitations for non
willful violations of ADEA. 
 Sperling had already notified 600 potential plaintiffs and over 400 filed 
written consents within the two year statute of limitations applicable to their individual 
actions.  To ensure that all potential plaintiffs would receive notice of the suit, 
Sperling moved for discovery of the names and addresses of all similarly situated 
employees and requested the court to send notice of the action to all potential class 
members in accordance with section 7(b) of ADEA,0 borrowed from section 16(b) of FLSA.
The district court granted Sperling's motion on January 5, 1988 and required all consent 
                     
0Section 7(b) of the ADEA reads, in relevant part: 
 
 The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance 
with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 
216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and 
subsection (c) of this section. . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 626(b). 
0Section 16(b) of the FLSA requires each plaintiff to opt-in to the class actions it 
allows.  It reads, in pertinent part: 
 
 (b) . . . An action . . . may be maintained against any employer 
. . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or 
themselves and other employees similarly situated.  No employee shall 
be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in 
writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court 
in which such action is brought. . . . 
 
29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b). 
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forms to be filed with the court within a definite, limited time.  See Sperling v. 
Hoffmann-La Roche, 145 F.R.D. 357, 358 (D.N.J. 1992).  Both this Court and the United 
States Supreme Court subsequently affirmed this order.  See Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 
Inc., 862 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 482, 486 (1989) (district court has 
discretion under ADEA to implement 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) by facilitating notice to 
potential plaintiffs who had not yet filed written consents to join). 
 In April 1990, notice of the pendency of this action was circulated to Hoffmann
La Roche's former employees.  In response, within the time permitted by the district 
court's order but after the two year statute of limitations on their individual actions 
had expired, another 102 persons filed consents to join Sperling's representative acti
In September 1991, Sperling asked the district court to hold that these 102 consents were 
timely filed because the complaint in the representative action legally tolled the statute 
of limitations under ADEA.0  The district court referred the matter to a Special Master.  
The Special Master recommended granting Sperling's motion to join or incorporate into the 
opt-in class the 102 persons who filed consents in accordance with the procedure the 
district court established in its order after the statute would have run on their 
individual actions. 
 The district court adopted the Special Master's recommendation and granted 
Sperling's motion for legal tolling. See Sperling, 145 F.R.D. at 366.  It concluded 
"[a]nalysis of the statutory scheme of ADEA, the existing case law, and the policies and 
goals underlying class actions and statutes of limitations, persuades me to find that the 
best resolution of this issue is that the statute of limitations is tolled in ADEA class 
                     
0At the time Sperling filed this motion, the issue of the availability of legal tolling 
under the ADEA was before this Court in Mershon v. Elastic Stop Nut Div. of Harvard 
Indus., Inc., No. 90-5597 (3d Cir. 1991) (order dismissing appeal as moot).  The parties 
in Sperling agreed to defer further proceedings until decision of this Court.  Both 
Sperling and Hoffmann-La Roche had filed briefs as amicus curiae in Mershon. After we 
heard oral argument in Mershon, but before we decided the case, the parties in Mershon
reached a settlement and we dismissed the appeal as moot. 
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actions." Id. at 360.  It rejected Hoffmann-La Roche's argument that section 7 of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act0 was implicitly incorporated into unamended section 7(e) of ADEA 
along with section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act's incorporation.  Instead, the district 
court reasoned that Congress intended to incorporate only certain provisions of section 
16(b) of FLSA, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, into ADEA.  Id. at 361.  Section 6 
of the Portal-to-Portal Act0 was expressly incorporated while section 7 of that Act was 
not.  Id. 
                     
0Section 7 reads: 
 
 In determining when an action is commenced for the purposes of 
section 255 of this title, an action . . . under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.], . . . 
shall be considered to be commenced on the date when the complaint is 
filed; except that in the case of a collective or class action 
instituted under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 
. . . it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any 
individual claimant-- 
 
 (a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if 
he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the 
complaint and his written consent to become a party 
plaintiff is filed on such date in the court in which the 
action is brought; or 
 
 (b) if such written consent was not so filed or 
if his name did not so appear--on the subsequent date on 
which such written consent is filed in the court in which 
the action was commenced. 
 
29 U.S.C.A. § 256. 
0Section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, expressly incorporated into ADEA until 1991, 
reads, in pertinent part: 
 
 Any action commenced . . . to enforce any cause of action for 
unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated 
damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 
U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.], . . .-- 
 
 (a) if the cause of action accrues on or after 
May 14, 1947--may be commenced within two years after the cause 
of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred 
unless commenced within two years after the cause of action 
accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful 
10 
 The district court did not base its decision solely on the selective 
incorporation theory.  It also recognized that ADEA 
does share some procedural similarities with the FLSA, [but] it also 
shares many similarities with Title VII, which is governed by Rule 
23. . . . Thus, it is reasonable that Congress intended the tolling 
rule applicable to Title VII cases to apply, rather than the non-
tolling rule of Section 256 of the FLSA.  Courts have looked to and 
applied other Title VII procedural aspects to ADEA class actions. 
 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  According to the district court, legal tolling in ADEA cases is 
consistent with the goals of any statute of limitations--to provide notice to defendants 
of claims against them and to discourage plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights. 
364.  In addition, the district court described some of the practical problems that would 
ensue if tolling were not permitted.  Sperling filed the complaint on May 7, 1985, three 
months after the alleged discriminatory act occurred.  The district court did not grant 
Sperling's motion for court-authorized service of notice until January 1988, almost three 
years after the alleged unlawful conduct.  Under Hoffmann-La Roche's interpretation, the 
statute of limitations would have expired before the court had authorized service of 
notice on putative members of the opt-in class.  Id. at 365. 
 After the district court handed down its order, Hoffmann-La Roche moved to 
certify the legal tolling issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1292(b).  The district court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal and a 
motions panel of this Court granted Hoffmann-La Roche's petition for permission to appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b). 
 
II. 
                                                                                          
violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of 
action accrued. 
 
29 U.S.C.A. § 255. 
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 This case is a private, representative action authorized by section 7(b) of 
ADEA.  The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 
1993). We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's order granting Sperling's 
motion for legal tolling under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b).0 
 Whether a consent to opt-in must be filed by a class member who wishes to 
participate in an ADEA class action within the same time limit he or she has to file an 
individual complaint is a question of law.  Accordingly, our review of the district 
court's decision is plenary.  See Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 850 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co., 746 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 1984) (per curiam).  As stated earlier, the quest
presented is also a matter of first impression in this Court. 
 
III. 
 Our holding that ADEA's statute of limitations is tolled for eligible class 
members by the initial filing of a representative complaint, as long as the representative 
nature of the action is clear on the complaint's face, is foreshadowed by our opinion in 
                     
0Section 1292(b), which gives us jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
[A] district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise 
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order 
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate 
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination 
of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.  The 
Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such 
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken 
from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after 
the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an 
appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court 
unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof 
shall so order. 
 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (emphasis in original). 
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Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1988).  There we listed with approval 
decisions in other courts that had allowed individuals who had not filed timely 
administrative charges to participate in an ongoing representative suit.0 
 
A. 
 In ADEA, Congress borrowed portions of many other statutes.  It incorporated 
parts of FLSA, parts of the Portal-to-Portal Act, and parts of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993). Each of 
these acts employs one of two types of class actions as aids to enforcement:  the opt
representative action permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and the opt
representative action authorized by section 16(b) of FLSA. Analysis of the district 
court's order permitting persons to opt-in after their individual actions could have been 
barred by limitations requires a brief review of these two types of class actions. 
 The opt-in class action that section 16(b) of FLSA permits has its antecedents 
in the old equity Bill of Peace, a device Chancellors once used to join numerous parties 
with common interests so that their common claims could be disposed of efficiently in one 
suit.  See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System
Ind. L.J. 301, 331 (1989).  In its inception, the Bill of Peace was a response to the 
                     
0It is also in accord with Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 852 F.2d 1008, 1018-19 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (an initial representative complaint which names all plaintiffs is sufficient 
for statute of limitations purposes and those named plaintiffs need not file consents); 
Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1986) (statutory purposes of allowing 
for conciliation and providing the employer with notice of charges against it are 
satisfied even if not every opt-in plaintiff has filed an administrative charge, so long 
as charges "fairly anticipate class claims"); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 594 
(10th Cir. 1980) ("'equitable tolling' doctrine [is] in keeping with the congression
purpose of ADEA . . ."); EEOC v. Gilbarco, Inc., 615 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that age discrimination action is commenced by filing of initial complaint, 
regardless of whether all participants are listed); Bean v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 600 F
754, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1979) (allowing post-deadline filing by additional plaintiffs if 
representative complaint put employer on notice "that the discrimination charges 
encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim 
that they should act accordingly"). 
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strict limits the common law placed on joinder of parties, though only the representative 
parties were named.  The modern opt-out class action also evolved out of the joinder 
mechanism of the old Bill of Peace, but it no longer has any easily perceptible traces of 
its antecedents in permissive joinder.  The opt-out class action is governed by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which differs in important respects from the opt-
class permitted by section 16(b) of FLSA.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) (a class 
action judgment is binding on all class members "who have not requested exclusion").  
Thus, if a person does not wish to be bound by an order in a Rule 23 class action he must 
specifically ask to be excluded. 
 While ADEA's opt-in class action is not governed by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3), class actions brought under Title VII are governed by the opt-out 
provisions of Rule 23.  See Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 717 F.2d 761, 765-66 (3d Cir. 
1983), vacated, 468 U.S. 1201, reinstated, 750 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1984).  The law on 
limitations in Rule 23 actions is settled.  In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah
414 U.S. 538 (1974), the Supreme Court recognized that the claims of all class members 
under Rule 23 are protected by the filing of an original, timely complaint.  See American 
Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551. The complaint in American Pipe alleged a violation of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West Supp. 1994).  The Supreme Court held individual 
satisfaction of the statute of limitations is not required in Rule 23 class actions 
because: 
[T]he difficulties and potential for unfairness which, in part, 
convinced some courts to require individualized satisfaction of the 
statute of limitations by each member of the class, have been 
eliminated, and there remain no conceptual or practical obstacles in 
the path of holding that the filing of a timely class action complaint 
commences the action for all members of the class as subsequently 
determined.  Whatever the merit in the conclusion that one seeking to 
join a class after the running of the statutory period asserts a 
"separate cause of action" which must individually meet the timeliness 
requirements, such a concept is simply inconsistent with Rule 23 as 
presently drafted.  A federal class action is no longer "an invitation 
to joinder" but a truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather 
than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions. 
14 
 
 
American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550 (footnote and citation omitted). The rule tolling the 
statute of limitations when the class action complaint is filed is commonly referred to as 
the "American Pipe rule."  See Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 878 (2d Cir. 1987); Fernandez 
v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 462 U.S. 650 (1983). 
 When class relief is sought pursuant to section 16(b) of FLSA, as modified 
section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, the rule governing the timeliness of an opt-
class member's consent to join a class is different.  By section 7 of the Portal-to
Act, all class members who seek relief under FLSA must submit their affidavits of consent 
before the statute of limitations applying to their individual claims has run.  In the 
early case of Gibbons v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 173 F.2d 337, 
339 (2d Cir. 1949), the court stated "[t]he terms of the Portal-to-Portal Act indicate 
that one of its aims was to prevent the assertion of surprise claims by unnamed employees 
at a time when the statute of limitations would otherwise have run."  Id.; see also
U.S.C.A. §§ 255-256. 
 The restrictive provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act were thought necessary to 
control what Congress viewed as the virtually unlimited liability generated by the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 
(1946).  In Mt. Clemens, the Supreme Court held an employer was responsible for paying an 
employee from "portal-to-portal," that is, from the time he arrived at work until the time 
he left, including the time it took for him to get to and from the time clock to his 
actual job site.  Id. at 690-92.  The Supreme Court's decision, which was unexpected by 
industry, led employers to fear huge damages because FLSA had no express statute of 
limitations.  The flood of claims Mt. Clemens was thought likely to generate also caused 
the government to fear large enforcement costs.  Congress's reaction to Mt. Clemens
the Portal-to-Portal Act.  Its legislative history reflects these concerns:  
15 
 The uncertainty of the present situation with its tremendous 
threat is seriously interfering with efforts to return to a peacetime 
economy with full and efficient production; it has clogged the courts 
with new and expensive litigation; it interferes with the right of 
collective bargaining; it threatens to add greatly to the cost of 
goods and services bought by the Government, while at the same time 
reducing the Federal revenue; it is a serious burden on interstate 
commerce. 
 
 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, H.R. Rep. No. 71, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess., reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034.  Thus, when Congress enacted the 
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, one year after Mt. Clemens, it severely restricted the 
claims an employee could make for back wages by various means, including a strict statute 
of limitations. 
 The representative mechanism Congress created for use in age discrimination 
cases differs from both the Rule 23 class action used in Title VII and the more 
restrictive representative action FLSA permits.  These differences seem clear from the 
language of ADEA as well as its legislative history. 
 Congress did not incorporate all the class action provisions of FLSA and the 
Portal-to-Portal Act into ADEA, nor did it add an age discrimination cause of action to 
either FLSA or Title VII.  Indeed, Congress declined to adopt a bill that would have 
amended FLSA to bring age discrimination within its prohibitions.  See Levine v. Bryant
700 F. Supp. 949, 952 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting S. 788, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), 
reprinted in, 113 Cong. Rec. 2199 (1967)).  Instead, Congress pieced ADEA together by 
selectively incorporating into it specific parts both of Title VII and FLSA.  ADEA is the 
offspring of these two parents, but the mixture of traits it has inherited from each gives 
it its own individuality. 
 Congress was precise in selecting the portions of other acts that were to 
comprise ADEA.  Only specific subsections of FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act and Title VII 
were incorporated. Among those left out was section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, one of 
16 
the restrictive clauses which Congress felt was needed to stem the tide of litigation it 
feared would otherwise follow the decision in Mt. Clemens. 
 The opt-out class mechanism of Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2) was also excluded by 
Congress's incorporation of the opt-in provisions of section 16(b) of FLSA.  Thus, age 
discrimination plaintiffs must affirmatively express their desire to join a pending 
representative action.  The converse is true under Rule 23(c)(2).  Members of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class are automatically included and remain so unless they make a timely election 
to opt-out.0  On the other hand, "the prohibitions of the [ADEA] were derived in haec
verba from Title VII."  Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). 
 We see nothing in either the unamended statutory text or the legislative hist
of ADEA that indicates we should incorporate section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act's 
restrictions into it.  Indeed, we think this would be inconsistent with both the Act's 
text, as it appeared prior to 1991, and Congress's intent.  Cf. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 
581-82.  We are not persuaded to the contrary by O'Connell v. Champion International 
Corp., 812 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1987).  There the court, considering only Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15's relation-back doctrine, stated: 
The District Court held, and we agree, that the relation-back doctrine 
must yield in ADEA cases to the specific provision of 29 U.S.C. § 256 
that an action may be commenced only by the filing of a complaint by 
the named individual, or by his affirmatively opting into a previously 
commenced class action. 
 
 
Id. at 394.  The O'Connell court did not expand on its reasoning or consider the 
possibility that Congress's refusal to incorporate section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act 
into ADEA was an indication that ADEA's statute of limitations, taken verbatim from 
                     
0If the original version of Rule 23, with its "spurious" class action, were still in 
effect, plaintiffs would still have to opt-in to be bound by the decision.  See Fed.
Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendment; see also Sward, supra, at 332.
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section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, should be tolled for the benefit of persons who 
opt-in to a timely filed representative action.0 
 We are bound by the intent of Congress, as we perceive it.  In deciding to 
borrow parts of FLSA's statute of limitations for ADEA, Congress refused to carry over 
section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act requiring class members who desire to opt-in to 
representative actions brought under FLSA to do so within the time limits imposed on 
individual claims.  Instead, it chose to incorporate only section 6's limitations on 
individual claims. Its incorporation of selected provisions into section 7(b) of ADEA 
indicates that Congress deliberately left out those provisions not incorporated.  See
Morelock v. NCR Corp., 586 F.2d 1096, 1103 (6th Cir. 1978) (noting that 29 U.S.C.A. §
is not applicable to age discrimination suits because Congress did not incorporate it into 
ADEA), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979). Indeed, the decision we make today strikes us as
a fairly routine application of the traditional rule of statutory construction pithily 
captured in the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.0  Thus, as the Court 
explained in Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942), 
"[g]enerally speaking a 'legislative affirmative description' implies denial of the non
described powers."  Id.  This maxim takes on more life in ADEA because of the thorough 
legislative understanding of the law in this area when Congress enacted ADEA.  As the 
Supreme Court stated: 
[I]n enacting the ADEA, Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge 
of the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation and a 
willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or 
inappropriate for incorporation. 
 
                     
0The rationale of O'Connell may be inconsistent with that of the same court in Kloos v. 
Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d at 397. Kloos, however, dealt with the sufficiency of an 
administrative charge to place an employer on notice that he was dealing with a 
representative action and not specifically with application of the statute of limitations 
governing court actions to persons who opt-in to a representative action in the district 
court. 
0Translated, the maxim reads:  "expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."  
Black's Law Dictionary 521 (5th ed. 1979). 
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Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 581 (Congress intended trial by jury to be available in private 
actions under ADEA). 
 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), the Supreme 
Court precluded judges from reading into ADEA sections of FLSA Congress had left out.  
There, the Supreme Court refused to imply incorporation of FLSA's limits on liquidated 
damages into ADEA absent specific incorporation by Congress.  Id. at 128 n.22.  Here, the 
two and three year statutes of limitations in section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act had 
been expressly incorporated into ADEA, but section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 
requiring persons desiring to opt-in to a representative action to do so within the time 
limit FLSA imposes on individual actions, was never expressly incorporated.  Thus, under a 
selective incorporation theory, we must reject Hoffmann-La Roche's argument that legal 
tolling would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
 Moreover, the special problems of open-ended unanticipated claims that Mt
Clemens created are not present under ADEA so long as both the charge and the complaint 
put the employer on notice that class relief will be sought.0 
 
B. 
 An opt-in class action under ADEA is more than a device for the permissive 
joinder of parties.  Hoffmann-La Roche's argument that the opt-in procedure of section 
16(b) of FLSA is a substitute for permissive intervention and therefore that Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 24(b) provides an appropriate analogy for determination of the 
timeliness of a consent to a representative action under ADEA is not persuasive.  
Hoffmann-La Roche's argument that Rule 24 applies is only a variation on the equally 
unpersuasive argument that incorporation of section 16(b) of FLSA into ADEA incorporates 
                     
0For a comprehensive critique of Mt. Clemens and a full consideration of the problems it 
raises, see H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process:  Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law 1296-1301 (tent. ed. 1958). 
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Rule 20's rules on permissive joinder.  We rejected this analogy to permissive joinder 
under Rule 20 in our earlier decision in this case.  See Sperling, 862 F.2d at 446. There 
we stated "that [§ 16(b)] does more than create the right of permissive joinder already 
provided by Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."  Id. (citation omitted); 
also Lusardi, 855 F.2d at 1078 (rejecting section 16(b)'s analogy to either permissive 
joinder or intervention). 
 We think a representative action brought under ADEA is commenced on behalf of 
all consenting class members when the original representative complaint is filed.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").  
It has already been firmly settled, in the context of Rule 23 class actions, that "a 
tolling rule for class actions is not inconsistent with the purposes served by statutes of 
limitations."  See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983).  We think 
application of principles of legal tolling to a class action for age discrimination is 
also consistent with the three basic purposes a statute of limitations serves.  They are 
first a "practical and pragmatic device[] to spare the courts from litigation of stale 
claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses 
have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 
101 n.9 (1982) (quoting Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945)).  So long 
as the initial complaint is timely, a claim, by definition, is not stale.  Secondly, 
"[l]imitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims."  
Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 352.  Finally, limitations periods "prevent plaintiffs 
from sleeping on their rights."  Id.  When filed within the statute of limitations, the 
original representative complaint, as long as it shows on its face its representative 
nature, tolls the running of the statute of limitations.  It provides an employer 
reasonable notice of the claim for class relief.0  When a complaint clearly indicates the 
                     
0We do not think this rationale is weakened by the 1991 amendment to section 626(e) of 
ADEA.  The amendment deleted the reference to section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act and 
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claim's representative nature, the employer is put on notice that it faces a broader and 
potentially more serious problem than an individual action would create. 
 Rule 23(d) then allows a district court to prevent abusive tolling extensions 
through its case management power.0 See Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 486 (noting that "once an 
ADEA action is filed, the court has a managerial responsibility to oversee the joinder of 
additional parties to assure that the task is accomplished in an efficient and proper 
way").  Tolling the statute of limitations once the representative complaint is filed also 
allows distribution of notice to potential plaintiffs to proceed while the question of 
class certification is pending.0 Potential plaintiffs are made aware of their rights.  If 
the district court, pursuant to its case management powers, promptly sets a reasonable 
cut-off date for closing the opt-in class, the scope of the suit is limited and made known 
to the defendant employer within a reasonable time after the claim seeking class relief is 
                                                                                          
instead provided a 90-day period, running from EEOC's dismissal of charges, in which 
employees must file suit.  Under the unamended version of ADEA, employees had two years 
from the date of the alleged discriminatory conduct to file suit, regardless of whether 
EEOC had yet ruled on their administrative charges.  The purpose of the amendment was "to 
restore and strengthen civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment."  H.R. 
Rep. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
549, 549.  Congress passed it because EEOC was generally unable to act on all age 
discrimination claims before the statute of limitations expired.  As a result, thousands 
of age discrimination charges were lost without consideration of their merits.  See
Rep. No. 102-40(II), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 41 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
694, 734; H.R. Rep. No. 102-1093, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).  The 1991 amendment was not 
meant to shorten the statute of limitations period. 
0Again, we think analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) is appropriate.  It 
provides, in pertinent part: 
 
In the conduct of actions . . . the court may make appropriate orders:  
. . . (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or 
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in 
such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of 
any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or 
of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the 
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or 
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; . . . (5) dealing with 
similar procedural matters. 
0Because employers generally have business records containing the vital statistics and 
work histories of their past employees, they are in the best position to define the outer 
limits of class size.  
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filed.  Such a controlled tolling of ADEA's statute of limitations seems to us to 
accomplish fully the intent of Congress without inflicting any untoward inequity on an 
employer who knows before the statute runs that he is dealing with a representative class 
action. 
 
IV. 
 Accordingly, in answer to the question certified, we hold that the filing of the 
original complaint tolled the applicable two year statute of limitations for those 
plaintiffs who joined the action after the limitations period for their individual actions 
had run.  Section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act cannot be used to limit the time within 
which persons "similarly situated" to a representative plaintiff who has filed a timely 
complaint for age discrimination may opt-in to an ADEA representative class action.  Legal 
tolling is consistent in this case with the purposes behind a statute of limitations.  
The district court's order granting Sperling's motion for legal tolling will be affirmed 
and the case remanded to it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
